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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the huge number of possible seat distributions following a general election in a 
multi-party parliamentary democracy, there are far fewer classes of seat distribution sharing 
important strategic features. We define an exclusive and exhaustive partition of the universe 
of theoretically possible n-party systems into five basic classes, the understanding of which 
facilitates more fruitful modeling of legislative politics, including government formation. 
Having defined a partition of legislative party systems and elaborated logical implications of 
this partition, we classify the population of postwar European legislatures. We show 
empirically that many of these are close to critical boundary conditions, so that stochastic 
processes involved in any legislative election could easily flip the resulting legislature from 
one type to another. This is of more than hypothetical interest, since we also show that 
important political outcomes differ systematically between the classes of party system – 
outcomes that include duration of government formation negotiations, type of coalition 
cabinet that forms, and stability of the resulting government.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Any legislative election in a multiparty system may distribute seats between parties in a huge 
number of different ways. Ignoring party names, for example, there are 2,977,866 different 
distributions of 100 seats between up to 10 parties (Laver and Benoit 2003).1 Considering the 
politics of building legislative majorities, however, many seat distributions are functionally 
equivalent, generating the same set of winning coalitions. Take a five-party 100-seat 
legislature with a majority winning threshold, and three possible distributions of seats 
between parties: A(48, 13, 13, 13, 13); B(48, 43, 3, 3, 3); C(40, 15, 15, 15, 15). These very 
different legislatures are equivalent in the sense that the largest party can form a winning 
coalition with any other party, while all other parties must combine to form a winning 
coalition that excludes the largest. The three legislatures do differ  in  terms  of  their  “fragility,”  
however. If the largest party in legislature A loses a single seat to one of the others, then it 
can no longer form a two-party winning coalition with any of the others; the set of winning 
legislative coalitions radically changes. Legislature C is much less fragile in this sense; at 
least five seats must change hands to affect the set of winning coalitions. 
In what follows, we define a set of equivalence classes that capture such similarities 
and differences between legislative party systems. Since any observed election result is the 
realization of a random draw from a distribution of expected results, different draws from the 
same distribution may produce legislatures that fall into different classes. Small reallocations 
of seats between parties can then flip the realized legislature from one class to another, 
making the effective election result, in terms of downstream legislative politics, something of 
a dice roll. Following the realization of an actual election result that leaves the legislature 
close to a boundary condition, furthermore, non-random strategic defections from one party 
to another may flip the legislature from one class to another, offering rent-seeking 
opportunities for wannabe defectors. 
The strategic implications of such critical thresholds have not passed unnoticed. They 
give rise to notions such as the Shapley value and to power indices such as the Shapley-
Shubik and Banzhaf indices (Banzhaf 1965; Shapley and Shubik 1954; Shapley 1952; 
Felsenthal and Machover 1998; Stole and Zwiebel 1996).2 Many different distributions of 
seats between parties generate the same vector of Shapley or Banzhaf values. For example, 
the set of theoretically possible five-party 100-seat legislatures referred to above has 38,225 
                                                 
1 All replication materials for this paper can be accessed at: TBA. (Materials submitted to Dataverse on 11 
February 2014). 
2 Stole and Zwiebel (1996), among others, derive the Shapley value as a prediction from a non-cooperative 
alternating offers bargaining game. 
Basic arithmetic of legislative decisions / 3 
different distributions of seats between parties, but only 20 different Shapley vectors (Laver 
and Benoit, 2003). Shifting a single seat from one party to another can change Shapley 
values dramatically, or not change them at all. Within the traditions of non-cooperative game 
theory,   these   thresholds   inform  a   literature  on  “minimal   integer   representations”   (MIRs)  of  
weighted voting games (Ansolabehere et al. 2005; Laver et al. 2011; Montero 2006; Snyder 
et al. 2005; Freixas and Molinero 2009).3 
Building on this work, we have three core objectives in this paper. First, we specify 
an exclusive and exhaustive partition of the universe of legislative party systems and derive 
theoretically relevant implications of this classification. This partition is far more 
parsimonious than the set of discrete Shapley or Banzhaf vectors4,  and its implications are 
“model   free”, in the sense they are accounting identities arising from binding arithmetic 
constraints and hold regardless of utility functions of key agents or local institutional 
structure. Second, we show that many real legislatures in postwar Europe were close to 
critical boundary conditions. Third we show this is substantively important. Different classes 
of legislature are associated with different political outcomes in real parliamentary 
democracies. First, however, we motivate our argument with a recent example of government 
formation where our boundary conditions made a big difference. 
GREECE 2012 
Greek voters went to the polls in May 2012 facing the specter of default on  their  country’s 
sovereign debt. The largest party, New Democracy (ND), won 108 of the 300 legislative 
seats, 43 short of the majority needed to form a government (see Table 1). The only two-
party winning coalition was between ND and the second largest party, Syriza. This generated 
a   “top-two”   party   system   in   the terms we define below, complicated by the fact the two 
largest parties fundamentally disagreed on the EU bailout. ND approached every other party 
except the extreme anti-European Golden Dawn (XA). Each refused to go into government. 
As mandated by the Greek constitution, the second largest party (Syriza) and third largest 
(PASOK) attempted in turn to form governments. These attempts also failed. As a last resort, 
                                                 
3 A minimal integer representation is the vector of smallest integers that generates, for a given winning quota, 
the same set of winning coalitions as the vector of raw seat totals. Consider three  very  “different”  legislative  
party systems in a setting with a majority decision rule: (49, 17, 17, 17); (27, 25, 24, 24); and (2, 1, 1, 1). All 
generate the same set of winning coalitions. The largest party can form a winning coalition with any other; all 
others must combine to exclude the largest party. These legislative party systems share the same vector of 
Shapley or Banzhaf values (1/2, 1/6, 1/6, 1/6), and the same MIR (2, 1, 1, 1). Despite large superficial 
differences, in this precise sense these party systems are in an equivalence class. 
4 Laver and Benoit (2003: p224) show, for an eight-party 100-seat legislature, there are 930,912 different 
distributions of seats between parties and 49,493 different Shapley vectors. There remain just five legislative 
types in our sense. 
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the President himself proposed a government comprising ND, PASOK and a small left wing 
party, Democratic Left (DIMAR). However DIMAR, from the beginning reluctant to accept 
conditions of the EU-IMF package, blocked this, knowing ND and PASOK lacked the 151 
seats needed to form a government.  
 
May June 
 Name Seats Name Seats   
ND 108 ND 129 
 Syriza 52 Syriza 71 
 PASOK 41 PASOK 33 
 ANEL 33 ANEL 20 
 KKE 26 XA 18 
 XA 21 DIMAR 17 
 DIMAR 19 KKE 12 
 
     Total 300 
 
300 
 Threshold 151 
 
151 
 Legislative type D 
 
B 
 
     Table 1. Legislative arithmetic in the Greek elections of May and June 2012 and 2010.  
“Legislative  Type”  is  explained  below. 
 
New elections were called for June, and realized a crucial difference in the legislative 
arithmetic. The first and third largest parties, two seats short after the previous election, now 
controlled a majority of seats between them. The Greek legislative party system flipped out 
of   a   “top   two”   state   and   ND   was now a   “strongly   dominant”   party.   This   substantially  
weakened the second largest party, Syriza, even though Syriza increased its seat total from 
52 to 71. The key fact arising from the new legislative arithmetic in Greece was that that ND 
and PASOK could now form a government alone – even though the ND seat total declined 
from 41 to 33. Given the new reality that the anti-bailout Syriza could not form a government 
even with all other parties, DIMAR accepted the deal they blocked one month before, joining 
the government  with  “conditional  support”.5 Two election results in Greece, one month apart, 
generated two very different types of legislature. 
                                                 
5 The  resulting  coalition  was  a  “surplus”  majority  coalition.  DIMAR  left  this  in  June  2013,  leaving  a  minimum  
winning coalition in place as the incumbent government.  
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CLASSES OF LEGISLATIVE PARTY SYSTEM 
An exclusive and exhaustive partition of the universe of legislative party systems 
Consider a legislature comprising n perfectly disciplined parties, labeled P1, P2,…   Pn,, in 
descending order of seat share. The number of seats controlled by Pi is Si. Any legislative 
party system can be written as (W: S1, S2,  …  Sn) where, according to binding constitutional 
rules, a successful proposal must be supported by a coalition of legislators whose number 
equal or exceeds W. The winning quota is decisive: if a coalition, C, of legislators is winning 
then its complement, C’, is losing. W must therefore be at least a simple majority of 
legislators, though in most of what follows W could be a supermajority.6 We label a coalition 
between Px and Py as PxPy. A  “pivotal”  party can render a winning coalition losing by leaving 
it;;  a  “minimal  winning”  coalition comprises only parties that are pivotal. Define an exclusive 
and exhaustive partition of the universe of possible legislative party systems into five 
equivalence classes, which we call “types”, using sizes of the three largest parties, relative to 
each other and to W. This is set out in Figure 1.  
Universe of possible legislative party systems 
Single winning 
party 
No single winning party 
S1 ≥ W S1 < W 
S1 + S2  ≥  W S1 + S2  < W 
S1 + S3  ≥  W S1 + S3  < W 
S2 + S3  < W S2 + S3  ≥  W 
A: Single 
winning party 
B: Strongly 
dominant party 
C: Top-three D: Top-two E:  Open 
Figure 1. Partitioning the universe of legislative party systems. 
 
                                                 
6 Note immediately that if W is decisive, then S1 + S2 + S3 < 2W and hence S2 + S3 ≤  4W/3 and S3 ≤  2W/3. 
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While our partition specifies constitutionally binding arithmetical constraints on 
legislative bargaining, it is no substitute for a model that specifies an institutional 
environment, agent utility functions, preferences, and so on. Knowing the May 2012 election 
in Greece returned a top-two legislature does not in itself tell us that government formation 
must be deadlocked. What it does tell us is that the only two-party winning coalition was 
between the two largest parties. Our explanation of deadlock, knowing the legislative type, 
derives from an implicit model of policy-based government formation and the knowledge 
that the two largest parties held fundamentally opposed positions on key issues. Our 
explanation of the end of the deadlock in June, assuming agent preferences did not change, is  
that a new election returning a new type of legislature removed a key constraint, so that, 
despite declining in size, the largest party could now find partners in a winning coalition that 
did not fundamentally disagree with it. 
Definitions and properties of classes of legislative party system 
Type A: Winning party (S1 ≥  W) 
A single “winning”  party  controls all legislative decisions. 
Type B: Strongly dominant party 
In strongly dominant party systems P1 has too few seats to control decisions (S1 < W), but 
can form a winning coalition with either P2 or P3 (S1 + S3 ≥  W), while P2 and P3 together 
cannot form a winning coalition (S2 + S3 < W). This makes P1 “dominant” in the sense 
defined by previous authors (Peleg 1981; Einy 1985; van Deemen 1989), whose definition 
refers to mutually exclusive losing coalitions made winning by adding the largest party. The 
intuition is more striking if we consider losing parties, and call party P* “strongly dominant”  
if there are two other parties Pi and Pj such that S* + Si ≥  W and S* + Sj ≥  W but Si + Sj < W. 
Define a Type B legislative party systems as one containing a strongly dominant party. There 
are several striking logical implications of having a strongly dominant party.7  
Implication B1: If P1 is strongly dominant, both P2 and P3 are members of every 
winning coalition excluding P1.8 
                                                 
7 Additional implications can be found in the supplementary materials for this paper. 
8 Since the coalition P1P2 is winning by definition of strong dominance, its complement (P1P2)’ is losing. Thus 
(P1P2)’  must add either P1 or P2 to become winning. If it excludes P1 it must add P2. Thus if P1 is strongly 
dominant, any winning coalition excluding P1 must include P2. An identical argument applies to P3. 
Basic arithmetic of legislative decisions / 7 
Implication B2: If P1 is strongly dominant, P1 and only P1 is a member of every 
winning two-party coalition.9  
The strategic significance of this is that a strongly dominant party holds a privileged 
bargaining position. If it is excluded from any winning coalition, which must then include 
both P2 and P3, it can tempt either P2 or P3, and quite possibly other pivotal parties, with an 
offer that can be implemented solely by dominant party and temptee, without regard to any 
other party. Only a strongly dominant party can be in this position. We show below that this 
is empirically relevant because legislatures with a strongly dominant party are not only 
common in postwar Europe, but also tend to be associated with minority governments that 
include the dominant party.  
 
Type B*: System-dominant party 
A special case of a strongly dominant party occurs when the largest party P1 is not winning 
on its own but can form a winning coalition with any other party (S1 + Sn ≥  W). Call such a 
party, P**, “system-dominant”.  
Implication B3: Any winning coalition excluding P** must include all other 
parties. This is a necessary and sufficient condition for system dominance.10 
This implies a strategic setting described  by  game  theorists  as  an  “apex  game”.   Identifying  
the sub-type of B* party systems is useful theoretically because, moving beyond three 
parties, apex games have a structure that is more tractable analytically than many others 
(Fréchette et al. 2005a; Montero 2002). Such systems are tractable because minimal winning 
coalitions comprise: the largest party plus any other; or every party except the largest. All 
parties except the largest are in this sense perfect substitutes for each other. Adding other as 
yet unmodeled constraints on government formation, arising from personal animosities, 
policy differences between the small parties or anything else, can make it extremely difficult 
to exclude a system dominant party from government. This in turn leads us to expect that 
Type B* party systems may be associated with minority governments comprising the system 
dominant party. Identifying Type B* systems is important empirically because, as we show 
                                                 
9 Since the largest possible two-party coalition excluding P1, which is P2P3, is losing, then every possible two-
party coalition excluding P1 is losing. 
10 For example, in a 100-seat legislature with a simple majority rule, this would arise if the partition of seats 
between 6 parties was (40, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12). Aragones (2007) offers a similar result, confined to four-party 
systems. 
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below, these do indeed tend to be associated with single party minority cabinets, as well as 
significantly shorter government formation negotiations,  and longer cabinet durations. 
Type Bk: k-dominant party 
We can generalize the notion of a system-dominant party to that of a k-dominant party, 
defined as a largest party able to form a winning coalition with Pk but not with Pk+1. For 
example, in the legislature (51: 35, 25, 16, 16, 8), the P1 would be 4-dominant, able to form a 
winning coalition with P4 but not with P5. A system-dominant party in an n-party system 
would be n-dominant. While not part our system of legislative types because it is not driven 
by the sizes of the three largest parties, this refinement may be useful in future work. Valuing 
parsimony, we do not pursue it here. 
Type  C:  “Top-three”  party system 
A “top-three” legislative party system arises when any pair of the three largest parties can 
form a winning coalition. S2 + S3 ≥  W is thus a necessary and sufficient condition for a top-
three system. Logically, this implies: 
Implication C1: Regardless of the number of parties in a top-three system, only 
the three largest parties can be pivotal.11  
Implication C2: Any coalition excluding any two of the three largest parties in a 
top-three system is losing.12 
Implication C3: The three largest parties in a top-three system are perfect 
substitutes for each other in the set of minimal winning coalitions.13  
By symmetry, the Shapley values and minimum integer weights (MIWs) of the top three 
parties must all be equal, and those of all other parties must be zero. In practical terms, this 
means an analyst looking at a new legislature with no majority party should first check to see 
whether the second and third largest parties can form a winning coalition. If they can, we are 
in the very distinctive bargaining environment of a top-three party system, in which any two 
                                                 
11 If P2P3 is winning then its complement, (P2P3)’, the coalition between P1 and all parties outside the top three, 
is losing. Similarly, P1P3 winning implies (P1P3)’  losing,  and  P1P2 winning implies (P1P2)’  losing. No party 
outside the top three can render winning a coalition excluding two of the top three parties, since every such 
coalition must be losing. Yet, by definition of Type C, every coalition including two of the top three parties is 
winning regardless of the addition or subtraction of another party outside the top three.  
12 By definition S1S2, S1S3, and S2S3 are all winning, so their complements are all losing. 
13 This follows from the definition of a Type C legislature and implications C1 and C2. 
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of the three largest parties can form a winning coalition and, no many how many other 
parties there might be, none of these is ever pivotal. 
The theoretical relevance of top-three party systems arises because of their analytical 
tractability. Settings with only three legislative parties, where any pair may form a winning 
coalition, produce a very tractable set of winning coalitions but are almost unheard of in 
practice,   rendering   “three-party”   results of dubious empirical relevance.  Top-three party 
systems  are analogous, on some modeling assumptions, to three-party systems to which a set 
of  “dummy”  agents  have  been  added who have no effect on play.14 The empirical relevance 
of top-three systems arises, as we show below, because minimal winning coalitions (MWCs) 
are very much more likely to occur in Type C than in any other type of party system. Indeed, 
it is only in Type C systems that MWCs are the most likely type of government.  
Type D: “Top-two”  party system 
Top-two legislative party systems arise when the two largest parties can form a winning 
coalition (S1 + S2 ≥  W) but P1 and P3 cannot (S1 + S3  < W). The only two-party winning 
coalition is between the two largest parties, since P1P3, the next-largest two-party coalition, is 
losing. Logically, this implies: 
Implication D1: One or other of the two largest parties in a top-two system is a 
member of every winning coalition.15  
Note there are top-two systems that privilege the largest party16 and others that do not17. For 
example, it may be that S1 + S3 + S4 ≥  W while S2 + S3 + S4 < W, giving P1 more options that 
P2. This suggests subdivisions of the top-two legislative type, though these require looking 
beyond sizes of the three largest parties, so we leave these for future consideration. 
Nonetheless, P1 and P2 are  at  the  “top”  of  any top-two party system in the sense that one or 
the other must be part of every winning coalition, while they and only they can form a 
winning coalition between themselves that excludes all others.  
                                                 
14 This sets aside the possibility that parties outside the top three may find ways to make binding commitments 
to vote together in the legislature, in effect combining into a single new legislative party and flipping the 
legislature into a new equivalence class. 
15 Since P1P2 is winning its compliment is losing, Note therefore that Result D1 also applies to Type B and 
Type C systems. 
16 For example (51: 35, 20, 13, 12, 10, 10).   
17 For example (51: 29, 26, 13, 12, 10, 10). 
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Type E: “Open”  systems 
The defining inequality, S1 + S2 < W, of the residual  class  of  “open” party systems implies 
there is no winning two-party coalition. It must also be true that S2 < W/2, a necessary 
condition for an open system. Logically, this implies a striking result focusing on W/2: 
Implication E1: S1 < W/2 is a sufficient condition for an open party system.18  
Every legislature in which the largest party has fewer seats than half the winning threshold 
has an open legislative party system, which immediately suggests another useful practical 
check for an observer looking at a new multi-party legislature. 
 Implication E2:  An open party system and majority decision rule imply N ≥  5.19  
It is therefore necessary to model at least five-party systems to cover the full range of logical 
possibilities arising from the legislative arithmetic we outline. The theoretical significance of 
open legislatures arises because it is never possible for a party excluded from a winning 
coalition to tempt any single pivotal member of that coalition with an offer that can be 
implemented exclusively by temptor and temptee, since any two-party coalition must be 
losing. This means even the largest party must deal with coalitions of other parties – and with 
potential collective action problems within such coalitions – in order to put together a 
winning coalition. In all other types of legislative party system, if the largest party does not 
win single-handed, it can win by forming a coalition with no more than one other party, at 
the very least the second-largest party. It can win without having to coalesce with coalitions. 
The empirical significance of open legislative party systems arises, as we show 
below, because they are associated with significantly longer government formation 
negotiations, with significantly shorter cabinet durations, and with surplus majority or 
minority governments. 
Legislative  types  and  politicians’  policy  preferences 
Our argument in this paper is intended to facilitate conclusions about legislative bargaining 
in multi-party systems that are model-free implications of constitutionally binding 
arithmetical constraints. Adding modeling assumptions about agent utilities or institutional 
structure may well refine our understanding of legislative bargaining, subject to the 
constraints we specify. In this context, our partition clearly has a bearing on how we think 
                                                 
18 S1 + S2 < W implies S1< W/2 since S1  ≥ S2  
19 A majority decision rule, N = 3 and S1 + S2 < W imply S3  ≥  W. N = 4 and  S1 + S2 < W imply S3 + S4  ≥  W.  
Since S1 ≥  S2 ≥  S3≥  S4, both implications are contradictions. 
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about the legislative politics of policy decisions. For example, it is easy to see that a system 
dominant party must control the median legislator on every policy dimension for which it is 
not at one of the two extreme positions, which has a bearing on the likelihood of minority 
governments. It is also easy to see that the median legislator on any policy dimension in a 
top-three system must belong to the most central of the three largest parties. Our approach 
thus enhances the modeling of legislative bargaining over policy. To develop this in any 
explicit way, however, requires assumptions about agent utility functions, from which we 
refrain here, though further discussion of this can be found in supplementary materials.  
EMPIRICAL DISTRIBUTION OF PARTY SYSTEM TYPES 
We now describe the empirical distribution of types of legislative party system in 29 
European parliamentary democracies during the period 1945-2010, using a dataset assembled 
by the European Representative Democracy (ERD) project (Andersson and Ersson 2012).20 
Winning coalitions in these empirical data are those comprising a simple majority of 
legislators. We partitioned all 361 European post electoral party systems in the ERD data 
universe into our six (including B*) basic types. Figure 2 maps out, for minority legislatures, 
the partition of party systems specified in Figure 1. Left panels show regions defined by seat 
shares of the three largest parties. Boundaries of these regions are specified by the 
inequalities set out in Figure 1. For example, a lower region of the upper left hand plot is the 
exclusive   preserve   of   “open”   party   systems,   given   the   defining   inequality   S1 + S2 < W. A 
region of the lower left-hand plot is the  exclusive  preserve  of  “top-three”  party  systems  given  
the defining inequality S2 + S3 ≥  W  and our deduction that S2 + S3 ≤  4W/3. Right panels of 
Figure 2 map the party systems of postwar Europe into the theoretically possible regions. The 
key empirical pattern is that regions close to boundary conditions are densely populated with 
empirical cases. Very small changes in the seat distributions of many actual legislatures 
would have flipped them from one type of party system to another. 
  
                                                 
20 For scrupulous documentation of coding protocols for this dataset, see http://www.erdda.se. Countries from 
the former Soviet bloc, as well as Spain, Portugal and Greece, were included after their first democratic 
election. 
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Figure 2. Partition of party systems in theory (left), and observed in postwar Europe (right). 
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Table 2 shows that 90 percent of postwar European legislatures with six parties or fewer fall 
into the highly constrained types A to C. In contrast, 57 percent of those with seven parties or 
more fall into the relatively unconstrained types D and E, where the number of arithmetically 
possible majority coalitions is very much greater and, in this sense, legislative politics is 
more complicated. We also see that dominant parties are not theoretical curiosities. 
Notwithstanding the typical PR electoral systems and resulting multi-party politics in 
postwar Europe, it is common to find legislative party systems dominated by one party able 
to play off the rest against each other. 
Number 
of 
legislative 
parties 
A B* B C D E 
Total 
Single 
party 
winning 
System 
dominant 
party 
Strongly 
dominant 
party 
Top      
three 
Top        
two Open 
2-6 47 37 64 35 18 1 202 
23% 18% 32% 17% 9% 0% 100% 
7-16 19 2 43 4 50 41 159 
12% 1% 27% 3% 31% 26% 100% 
All 66 39 107 39 68 42 361 
18% 11% 30% 11% 19% 12% 100% 
Table 2. Frequencies of legislative types in European legislative elections, 1945-2010. 
 
Figure 3 plots relative seat shares sizes of the three largest parties in postwar 
European legislatures. Similar seat shares across especially the second and third largest 
parties result in different types of party system. More than party seat shares per se, it is 
precise relationships between seat shares of the top three parties, relative to boundary 
conditions, that determine the type of party system.  
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Figure 3. Plots of S1 - S3 by legislative type: post-election party systems in the ERD Dataset. 
 
FRAGILITY OF LEGISLATIVE STATES 
If the distribution of expected legislative seat shares following an election straddles one of 
our boundary conditions, then small random shocks to vote shares, amplified in complex 
ways by electoral formulae, can have big effects. As long as the process generating votes has 
some residual variance—as does every model from the vast empirical literature in electoral 
behavior and electoral systems—then the process generating votes will be to some degree 
stochastic. When these differences are multiplied across numerous constituencies, with 
multiple parties and candidates, their aggregate effects can easily produce small shifts in 
seats from one party to another, even if underlying political and contextual factors remain 
unchanged. We simulate this in a simple and intuitive way by representing election results as 
random draws from an underlying distribution of expected results, where expected seat 
proportions remain constant but the prior distribution is assigned a non-zero variance. We 
draw a new seat allocation for each party from a multinomial distribution where the 
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proportions pi are the actual seat share for party i, and n is the total number of seats.21 By 
drawing new “shocked”  seat allocations based on observed party seat shares, we generated a 
set of election results that might plausibly have been realized within a specified range of 
expected variance.22  To simulate a range of “possible” distributions of legislative seats for 
every post-war European legislature in the ERD dataset – each consistent with the realized 
outcome – we drew 100 new elections for each observed seat allocation, and computed the 
legislative type associated with each possible outcome. The proportions of  “shocked”  
legislative types associated with each observed legislative type are shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Transitions from actual post-election governments to other legislative types, following 
simulated repeats of each election. Each of 361 post-election governments was redrawn 100 using 
observed seat proportions from a multinomial draw, and the y-axis reflects the proportions by original 
type of each of the 36,100 simulated types. The width of the columns is proportional to the relative 
frequency of observed legislative types from Table 2. 
Most shocked Type A party systems, for example, remained in Type A. The most 
common realization of a shock to a Type B* party system was to remain in Type B*, but 
about 25% became Type A systems, another 20% became Type B, and just under 10% 
                                                 
21 This means that parties who won no seats cannot win seats in any of the simulations, as pi=0 for a party that 
won no seats. An alternative would be to use Laplace smoothing where we added one seat to each party, but we 
avoided this because it would change the number of parties in the system and potentially represent a different 
legislative dynamic.  
22 We present stress tests of this assumption about the distribution of possible election results variance at 
alternative settings, along with supporting empirical evidence, in the supplementary materials for this paper. 
The full dataset of simulated results is also available with the replication materials for this paper. 
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became Type C. Similar transition probabilities for the other legislative types are presented in 
Figure 4. 
Moving beyond aggregate patterns reported in Figure 4, we now predict the particular 
legislative types that result from small shocks to seat shares associated with each election 
result. To illustrate our core argument most clearly, Table 3 highlights predictions of changes 
in the odds of flipping to each legislative type, given a change in the seat share of the 
smallest party – a party rarely the focus of attention in opinion polls or discussions of 
government formation. As control variables, we include differences between seat shares of 
each of the top three parties and their closest competitor, to hold constant the main effects 
that determine legislative types. Our estimations in Table 3 report five multinomial logistic 
regressions, one for each legislative type, except the majority Type A party system.23 Each 
exponentiated coefficient represents the relative risk (analagous to an odds ratio) of changing 
from the type that heads each column to the new type labeled in the row, given a one unit 
change in the relevant explanatory variable. Each column represents a separate multinomial 
logistic regression. To illustrate the interpretation of results from Table 3, consider the effect 
of a change in the seat share of the smallest party on the odds of becoming a Type D system. 
Look at the gray horizontal band of coefficients near the bottom of the table, associated with 
transitions to Type D party systems. A one per cent increase in the seat share of the smallest 
party increases the relative risk of a Type B party system becoming a Type D party system 
(thereby undermining the dominant position of the largest party) by about 15%. The same 
shift in the smallest party seat share increases the probability of Type C party system 
transitions into Type D (thereby making parties outside the top three pivotal in majority 
coalitions) by about 40%. Our classification of legislative types shows that small changes in 
the sizes of even the smallest party in the legislature can have big effects on legislative 
politics when no single party wins a majority. 
  
                                                 
23 Each regression uses the original legislative type (before simulating a new seat allocation) as the base 
outcome, and reports exponentiated coefficients representing relative risk ratios, or the multiplicative change in 
odds of the stated outcome relative to the base category, for a percentage point change in seat share (or seat 
share difference). 
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.    Original Legislative Type 
New 
Type 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables B* B C D E 
A P1 % Lead 1.258 1.325 1.366 1.243 
 
  
[1.224 - 1.293] [1.283 - 1.369] [1.263 - 1.479] [1.047 - 1.475] 
 
 
P2 % Lead 1.198 1.252 1.149 1.303 
 
  
[1.174 - 1.223] [1.227 - 1.276] [1.102 - 1.197] [1.201 - 1.414] 
 
 
P3 % Lead 1.176 1.118 0.932 1.321  
 
  [1.146 - 1.208] [1.086 - 1.150] [0.831 - 1.045] [0.911 - 1.914]   
 
Pn %' 0.782 0.749 0.856 0.637   
 
  [0.741 - 0.825] [0.680 - 0.826] [0.743 - 0.986] [0.350 - 1.159]   
B* P1 % Lead 
 
1.022 1.252 1.071 
 
   
[1.007 - 1.037] [1.193 - 1.314] [0.976 - 1.175] 
 
 
P2 % Lead 
 
1.036 0.925 1.151 
 
   
[1.027 - 1.046] [0.906 - 0.943] [1.102 - 1.202] 
 
 
P3 % Lead  0.929 0.666 0.915  
 
    [0.910 - 0.949] [0.631 - 0.704] [0.709 - 1.180]   
 
Pn %'   1.025 1.308 0.447   
 
    [0.976 - 1.076] [1.238 - 1.382] [0.328 - 0.610]   
B P1 % Lead 1.097 
 
0.849 1.069 1.149 
  
[1.081 - 1.114] 
 
[0.816 - 0.883] [1.054 - 1.085] [1.100 - 1.202] 
 
P2 % Lead 1.031 
 
0.913 1.058 1.13 
  
[1.017 - 1.045] 
 
[0.897 - 0.928] [1.047 - 1.069] [1.015 - 1.259] 
 
P3 % Lead 0.916  0.835 1.18 1.484 
 
  [0.888 - 0.945]   [0.803 - 0.867] [1.151 - 1.209] [1.398 - 1.576] 
 
Pn %' 0.956   1.217 0.825 0.628 
 
  [0.918 - 0.995]   [1.164 - 1.273] [0.783 - 0.869] [0.525 - 0.751] 
C P1 % Lead 0.783 0.82 
 
0.827 0.427 
  
[0.756 - 0.811] [0.804 - 0.836] 
 
[0.731 - 0.936] [0.427 - 0.427] 
 
P2 % Lead 0.978 1.034 
 
1.037 0.022 
  
[0.966 - 0.991] [1.023 - 1.045] 
 
[0.989 - 1.087] [0.00270 - 0.179] 
 
P3 % Lead 1.317 1.259  1.216 10.81 
 
  [1.259 - 1.378] [1.230 - 1.289]   [1.100 - 1.345] [9.383 - 12.46] 
 
Pn %' 0.954 0.783   0.474 0.279 
 
  [0.919 - 0.990] [0.741 - 0.826]   [0.396 - 0.569] [0.0309 - 2.519] 
D P1 % Lead 0.987 0.924 0.586 
 
1.077 
  
[0.923 - 1.056] [0.912 - 0.937] [0.503 - 0.684] 
 
[1.055 - 1.100] 
 
P2 % Lead 0.961 0.986 0.808 
 
1.456 
  
[0.896 - 1.030] [0.978 - 0.995] [0.757 - 0.863] 
 
[1.383 - 1.533] 
 
P3 % Lead 0.623 0.901 0.695  1.402 
 
  [0.417 - 0.932] [0.882 - 0.920] [0.617 - 0.782]   [1.352 - 1.454] 
 
Pn %' 0.996 1.155 1.406   0.762 
 
  [0.841 - 1.180] [1.107 - 1.206] [1.278 - 1.546]   [0.697 - 0.832] 
E P1 % Lead 
 
0.936 
 
0.897 
 
   
[0.887 - 0.988] 
 
[0.879 - 0.917] 
 
 
P2 % Lead 
 
0.603 
 
0.745 
 
   
[0.518 - 0.703] 
 
[0.723 - 0.767] 
 
 
P3 % Lead  0.83  0.785  
 
    [0.756 - 0.911]   [0.755 - 0.816]   
 
Pn %'   1.173   1.123   
 
    [0.958 - 1.437]   [1.048 - 1.203]   
 
Observations 3,900 10,000 2,700 5,900 3,500 
 Log-likelihood -4272.1183 -9665.0572 -2748.0535 -5111.8676 -1878.9035 
Table 3. Multinomial logistic regressions predicting simulated types from original legislative 
types. All coefficients are exponentiated to represent risk ratios, relative to the original type 
as a baseline. 95% confidence intervals are in brackets, with bold coefficients statistically 
significant at the p<=.05 level. Data are the same as for Figure 4. 
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TYPES OF LEGISLATIVE PARTY SYSTEM, TYPES OF POLITICAL OUTCOME 
Types of legislative party system and the “difficulty”  of  forming a government 
Rational politicians with complete information should negotiate equilibrium cabinets without 
delay:   “…   for   the   environments  most   interesting   in   policy-making applications, delay will 
almost  never  occur”  (Banks and Duggan 2006, 72-73). It is well known, however, that some 
government formation negotiations drag out much longer than others. If the environment 
evolves stochastically, and/or if party leaders exploit private information (about personal 
preferences or which proposals their legislators will accept) bargaining delays may arise in 
equilibrium (Merlo 1997; Merlo and Wilson 1995). Diermeier and van Roozendaal apply this 
insight to government formation negotiations, and find a strong empirical relationship 
between measures of uncertainty and durations of negotiations (Diermeier and Van 
Roozendaal 1998). Martin and Vanberg, and more recently Golder, confirm these findings in 
different ways (Golder 2010; Martin and Vanberg 2003). Their strongest conclusion is that 
negotiations immediately following an election tend to take much longer than those taking 
place between elections, following defeat or resignation of an incumbent.  
Each of these authors treats post-electoral government formation as an indicator of 
uncertainty, on the ground there is less information about preferences of new legislators 
immediately after an election. We also note that inter-electoral government formations are 
often endogenous to legislative politics; when a majority of legislators vote a government out 
of office, mid-term,  they presumably have some preferred alternative in mind. Inter-electoral 
formation negotiations may be shorter because they commence with this preferred 
alternative. 
Golder (2010) and others also associate longer formation negotiations with more 
“complex” bargaining environments, measuring complexity in terms of the number and 
ideological polarization of parliamentary parties. We argued above that different types of 
legislative party system are associated with different levels of complexity  or  “difficulty”  in  
coalition formation. Moving from Type A to Type E systems, we move from the simplest 
setting, with a single majority party, through settings with a dominant party in the catbird 
seat,  through  “top-three”  systems with only three pivotal parties no matter how many others 
there are, to the least constrained “open”   systems with many pivotal parties and many 
possible majority coalitions to explore. Our conjecture is that, as complexity of the coalition 
formation environment increases,  so  will  the  “difficulty”  and  hence  duration  of  government  
formation negotiations. Table 4 shows mean durations of formation negotiations, by type of 
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party system. The bottom row replicates previous findings that post-electoral negotiations 
last much longer (on average 39 days) than those between elections (13 days). The rightmost 
column supports our conjecture that mean durations of government formation negotiations 
should increase monotonically as the legislative arithmetic becomes less constrained.  
Type of system 
Post-
election 
Inter-
election 
All 
formations 
A:  Single majority party 20.3 8.1 15.7 
 
3.6 2.7 2.5 
B*: System dominant party 24.9 2.9 17.2 
 
5.4 0.9 3.8 
B’:  Strongly dominant party 32.6 16.1 25.0 
 
3.3 2.1 2.1 
C:  Top-three system 48.7 10.0 33.4 
 
7.7 4.2 5.5 
D:  Top-two system 46.5 18.5 34.0 
 
4.9 5.6 3.9 
E:  Open system 72.3 12.7 36.3 
 
7.0 2.0 4.2 
All formations 38.6 13.3 27.1 
 
2.2 1.4 1.4 
Table 4. Mean durations of government formation negotiations in postwar Europe, by type of 
legislative party system. Standard errors in italics. Formation durations data, taken from the 
ERD dataset, count days between election/government resignation and investiture of new 
government.  
Creating binary variables for legislative types, we use the Cox proportional hazards 
model specified by Golder (2010) to investigate whether these types predict delays in 
government formation. We follow Golder in using the number of legislative parties as an 
indicator of uncertainty, controlling for existence of a single majority party, and 
distinguishing post- and inter-electoral formations. Rather than using the subjective and 
potentially endogenous notion   of   “positive   parliamentarianism, we use the objective and 
binding constitutional constraint of a constructive vote of no confidence. Inter-electoral 
government formations should be much quicker with a constructive vote of no confidence, 
since the next government must be explicitly identified in the no confidence motion that 
defeats the incumbent. The constructive vote of no confidence should however have no effect 
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on post-electoral formations.24 Unlike the dataset used by Golder, which is confined to 
Western Europe and ends in 1998, the ERD dataset ends in 2010 and includes 10 former 
communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). We therefore include a CEE 
dummy since we expect greater uncertainty, hence longer bargaining delays, in these new 
party systems.25 Table 5 shows Cox proportional hazards estimates of the effects of 
independent variables on durations of government formation negotiations in postwar 
Europe.26  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 (country fixed effects) 
Post-
election 
Inter-
election 
Post-
election 
Inter-
election 
Post-
election 
Inter-
election 
Number of parties -0.10** (0.02) 
-0.14** 
(0.02) 
-0.08** 
(0.03) 
-0.13** 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
Constructive vote of 
no-confidence 
-0.14 
(0.12) 
0.85** 
(0.22) 
-0.11 
(0.11) 
0.94** 
(0.23) 
0.79 
(0.63) 
1.84** 
(0.44) 
CEE country -0.10 (0.11) 
-0.59** 
(0.16) 
-0.11 
(0.14) 
-0.60** 
(0.15) 
-1.19 
(0.74) 
-3.62** 
(0.79) 
Minority parliament -0.51** (0.21) 
-0.55** 
(0.17)     
B*: System-dominant 
party   
-0.23 
(0.32) 
0.45 
(0.28) 
-0.49 
(0.30) 
0.10 
(0.26) 
B’:  Strongly-
dominant party27   
-0.31 
(0.21) 
-0.28 
(0.26) 
-0.64** 
(0.25) 
-0.26 
(0.22) 
C: Top-three system   -0.94** (0.27) 
-0.24 
(0.33) 
-0.42 
(0.31) 
-0.68** 
(0.25) 
D: Top-two system   -0.65** (0.22) 
-0.14 
(0.27) 
-0.70** 
(0.27) 
-0.06 
(0.33) 
E: Open system   -0.90** (0.23) 
0.09 
(0.29) 
-1.20** 
(0.32) 
0.03 
(0.32) 
Log likelihood -1572 -1193 -1562 -1228 -1446 -1172 
Observations 331 266 331 272 331 272 
Table 5. Cox proportional hazards models of durations of government formation negotiations in 
Europe, 1945-201028  
                                                 
24 If we include the ERD variable for positive parliamentarianism in models that also include the constructive 
vote of no confidence, it has no significant effect on bargaining delays. It has the effects observed by Golder if 
the no-confidence variable is dropped. 
25 Golder included a measure of ideological polarization as another indicator of bargaining difficulty. When we 
included the ERD measure of ideological polarization, however, we found no significant effect, and therefore 
excluded it from the analysis we report here. 
26 Rather than following Golder and using interaction terms to capture effects of key independent variables, 
conditional on whether negotiations follow an election, we estimate different models for post-electoral and 
inter-electoral settings, since these differ in many ways relevant to government formation. 
27 Systems  labeled  B’  in  have  a  strongly  dominant  party  that  is  not  system  dominant. 
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Model 1 is a stripped-down benchmark. It replicates findings from previous work that 
increasing the number of parties, which has an exponential effect on the number of winning 
coalitions and hence the amount of information needed to take every possibility into account, 
reduces the hazard rate and thereby increases typical durations of government formation 
negotiations.29 This effect is essentially the same in post- and inter-electoral negotiations. As 
expected, a constructive vote of no confidence significantly shortens inter-electoral 
formation negotiations, but has no significant effect on post-electoral negotiations. Former 
Communist states do have longer negotiations in inter-electoral settings, but not immediately 
after elections.  
Model 2 replaces the simple distinction between systems with or without a majority 
party with the different types of legislative party system specified in Figure 1, using single 
party majority systems as the baseline. Coefficients for other independent variables are 
essentially unchanged. Types of legislative party system have the predicted effects on 
durations of post-electoral formation negotiations. These do not take significantly longer in 
systems with dominant parties than in those with majority parties.30 In contrast, there are 
significantly longer formation delays in Type C, D and E systems. Note in particular that, 
while our classification of party systems is affected strongly by the number of legislative 
parties, effects of party system types on bargaining delays are measured holding the number 
of parties constant. In contrast, differences between types of legislative party system have no 
systematic effect on durations of inter-electoral government formation negotiations. This is 
consistent   with   Golder’s   argument   that   inter-electoral formations are high-information 
settings, so that the different information requirements posed by different types of party 
system do not bite. It is also consistent with the view that there may be a particular candidate 
government in inter-electoral formations, so that the full range of coalition possibilities is less 
likely to be explored. Either way, our Model 2 estimates show that post- and inter-electoral 
government formations are completely different. Conventional arguments about government 
formation apply to negotiations immediately following elections, but not to those taking 
place mid-term. 
                                                                                                                                                       
28 Classifications of party systems by the authors; all other data from the ERD dataset. 
29 Diermeier and van Roozendal (1998) use the effective number of legislative parties in this context, but Golder 
uses the absolute number. It is this latter number that has a direct effect on the number of winning coalitions. 
We also agree with Golder that it is not a good idea to use the number of parties in government, as do Martin 
and Vanberg (2003); this is clearly endogenous to government formation negotiations. 
30 Non-significant  effects  are  in  the  “right”  direction,  with  negotiations  tending  to  be  longer than in Type A 
systems. 
Basic arithmetic of legislative decisions / 22 
Model 3 replicates Model 2, but adds a full set of country fixed effects, to eliminate 
the possibility that different countries tend to have different types of party system, with 
government formation negotiations tending to last longer in some countries as result of 
unmodeled differences between countries.31 Our classification of legislative party systems 
should pick up significant variation between different types of party system within the same 
country. We see that country fixed effects wash out the impact of the number of legislative 
parties but that the impact of party system types on post-electoral negotiations is robust to 
these. Legislative settings with system dominant parties do not have significantly longer 
formation negotiations than those with majority parties; Type D and Type E systems do have 
significantly longer formations. The differences are that Type B systems, with strongly 
dominant parties, have longer bargaining delays when country fixed effects are added, and 
top-three systems do not. All coefficients are in the predicted direction. The non-effect of 
party system types on inter-electoral formation durations is also robust to adding country 
fixed effects. Our legislative types effectively classify post-war European party systems 
according to the   “difficulty”,   measured   as the duration of negotiations, of forming 
governments in minority parliaments.  
Types of legislative party system and types of government 
Different types of legislative party system are also associated with different types of coalition 
cabinet. Theoretical and empirical accounts of government formation in parliamentary 
democracies typically distinguish between:  
x minimal winning coalitions (MWCs);  
x surplus coalitions, which include at least one member whose defection leaves the 
coalition winning;  
x minority cabinets, comprising parties that do not between them control a majority. 
Models assuming politicians are motivated only by private benefits of office tend to imply 
MWCs. Models assuming politicians are motivated by preferences over public policy 
outcomes may also imply minority or surplus majority cabinets (Laver 1998). There is also 
an informal folk-wisdom that surplus cabinets provide insurance against defections in times 
of high uncertainty or low party discipline (Laver and Schofield 1998). Table 6 classifies 
European postwar governments formed in minority situations into MWCs, minority and 
                                                 
31 Luxembourg, close to the overall mean for formation negotiations, is the excluded category.  
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surplus majority cabinets,32 further classifying minority governments into coalition and 
single party cabinets. It shows a striking relationship between type of legislative party system 
and type of government.33 Recall that top-three systems are the closest real-world analogue to 
analytically tractable “three-party”   systems and that models assuming office-seeking 
politicians, typically predict MWCs. Table 6 shows that MWCs are the norm for actual top-
three party systems, though such systems arise after only 11 percent of postwar European 
elections. Table 6 restates the well-known empirical pattern that well under half of all 
governments arising from post-war European minority systems are MWCs, while well over 
half are minority or surplus majority coalitions (Gallagher et al. 2012). Notwithstanding 
many theoretical models, MWCs are not the norm in real parliamentary settings and our 
classification of legislative party systems throws light on why this might be. 
Cabinet type 
B* 
System 
dominant 
party 
B’ 
Strongly 
dominant 
party 
C 
Top 
three 
D 
Top 
two 
E 
Open Total 
MWC  24 68 48 26 28 194 
Single party minority 29 62 7 16 5 119 
Minority coalition 3 29 3 33 21 89 
Surplus 4 32 1 42 38 117 
Total 60 191 59 117 92 519 
Table 6. Types of government forming from minority settings in Europe, 1945-2010. 
First, note that Type B* and Type B’ party systems are strongly associated with 
minority governments.  Over half of real parliaments with a system-dominant party, and 
nearly half of those with a strongly-dominant party, generate minority governments, typically 
comprising the single largest party. Without getting into fine print of any particular model of 
government formation, this reflects the plain fact that few winning coalitions exclude system-
dominant parties in particular, and strongly-dominant parties more generally. As other 
(modeled or unmodeled) constraints are brought to bear on government formation – squalid 
personal animosities, lofty policy disagreements, or anything in between – it can quickly 
                                                 
32 This includes all governments, not just those forming immediately after an election. 
33 We have specified type B systems as supersets of type B* systems. In this table and all that follow, however, 
we  create  and  exclusive  and  exhaustive  partition  of  systems  by  dividing  type  B  into  types  B*  and  B’.  Type  B’  is  
a type B legislature that is not B*. 
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happen that all winning coalitions excluding the dominant party become infeasible for one 
reason or another. This leaves the dominant party able to form a minority government 
because no feasible winning coalition agrees on an alternative. 
Turning to surplus majority cabinets, Table 6 shows these are strongly associated 
with the Type D and Type E party systems34 which, as we have seen, tend to sustain many 
more possible winning coalitions. If we assume that uncertainty about which coalition deals 
might or might not work increases with the number of winning coalitions, such uncertainty is 
much higher in the relatively unconstrained Type D and E party systems. The prevalence of 
surplus majority coalitions in these thus comports with the folk wisdom that surplus majority 
governments are responses to high levels of uncertainty whereby politicians insure against 
future intra-coalition disagreements by taking on surplus members. 
Overall, the striking patterns in Table 6 are that: Type B’ and B* systems dominated 
by the largest party are associated with minority cabinets; “three-pivotal-party”  negotiations  
in Type C systems are associated with minimal winning coalitions; and the less constrained 
and arguably more uncertain negotiations found in Type D and E systems are associated with 
surplus majority cabinets. 
Types of party system and typical government durations 
Once a government has taken office in a parliamentary democracy, a key question concerns 
how long it will last, in a setting where any government can at any time resign or be 
dismissed by a majority vote of no confidence. There is a substantial political science 
literature on government stability and it is not feasible to review or extend this here 
(Diermeier and Stevenson 1999, 2000; King et al. 1990; Laver and Shepsle 1998; Lupia and 
Strom 1995; Warwick 1994; Browne et al. 1986). Our conjecture, in the context of this 
literature, is that governments should tend to last longer in the most constrained Type A and 
Type B* systems, and less long in Type E systems where the number of winning alternatives 
to any incumbent government is highest.  Table 7 shows this to be true in aggregate terms for 
post-war European governments, whether these are formed immediately after elections or 
during the inter-electoral period following the exit of an incumbent.  
  
                                                 
34 With 36% and 41% of the relevant cases. 
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Type of legislative party system 
Post-
election 
Inter-
election 
All 
cabinets 
A:  Single majority party 1082 552 891 
 
59 61 51 
B*: System dominant party 942 509 786 
 
71 74 59 
B’:  Strongly  dominant  party 831 451 652 
 
52 36 35 
C:  Top-three system 987 425 775 
 
91 85 74 
D:  Top-two system 929 346 676 
 
55 41 45 
E:  Open system 695 289 455 
 
77 31 41 
All formations 909 414 688 
 
27 20 20 
Minimal winning cabinets 1034 43 
528 
48 
875 
37 
Single-party minority cabinets 735 
57 
373 
42 
568 
40 
Minority coalition cabinets 659 
78 
315 
41 
451 
43 
Surplus majority cabinets 774 
58 
414 
37 
587 
36 
Non-CEE 936 
29 
431 
24 
726 
23 
CEE 761 
63 
362 
31 
534 
40 
Table 7. Mean government durations, in days, by type of party system and cabinet.  
Standard errors in italics. 
Moving beyond a simple table, we deploy the Cox proportional hazards approach 
used above, taking account of key findings in the government termination literature. First, 
government  durations  are  treated  as  “censored”  if  they  are  brought  to  an  “artificial”  end  by a 
scheduled election. The data show a big spike in durations at about 1400 days, given a typical 
constitutional inter-election period of four years. Accordingly, government durations over 
1350 days are treated as censored. Second, governments forming between elections have 
lower potential durations than governments forming immediately after elections, while 
governments formed mid-term are negotiated in settings where a previous equilibrium 
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cabinet has been destabilized for some unmodeled reason. We therefore consider only 
governments forming immediately after an election.35 The empirical work cited above shows 
that the type of coalition cabinet in a minority setting has a significant bearing on its expected 
duration,  as  does  the  “complexity”  of  the  bargaining environment in which it is set. Our types 
of legislative party system capture the complexity of the bargaining environment, but the 
stripped down benchmark model uses the number of legislative parties to measure this.36 
Table 7 clearly shows that the key distinction in relation to cabinet types is between minimal 
winning cabinets and others, be they minority or surplus majority administrations. 
Accordingly, we control for cabinet type using a binary variable for whether the cabinet is 
minimal winning. Finally, we already assumed more uncertainty in the relatively new party 
systems of the post-communist CEE, and Table 7 confirms that governments tend to last less 
long in CEE countries, so we include a binary control for whether the cabinet was in a CEE 
country. 
Table 8 reports Cox proportional hazard estimates for three models of durations of 
governments formed after elections in postwar Europe. Model 1 is a stripped-down 
benchmark, using the absolute number of legislative parties to measure the complexity of the 
bargaining environment, an MWC dummy to control for cabinet type, and a CEE dummy to 
identify less-established post-communist party systems. Increasing the number of legislative 
parties, hence the number of possible legislative coalitions, significantly increases the hazard 
of a government termination, as does the fact that the cabinet is in a CEE country. Minimal 
winning coalitions are estimated to have lower probabilities of termination, holding other 
factors constant, though this coefficient is not statistically significant. 
Model 2 adds binary variables for type of party system, treating the least stable Type 
E system as the baseline type in minority settings. Proportional hazards estimates for these 
are all significant and negative, showing that each party system type is associated with a 
lower hazard rate (cabinets of longer duration) than those in Type E. As Table 7 suggests, the 
big difference in cabinet durations is between cabinets forming in Type E, open, systems and 
the rest. Model 3 adds a full set of country fixed effects, and shows that the lower hazard 
rates of cabinets in non-Type E systems are robust to this.37 
                                                 
35 Diermeier and Stevenson (1999, 2000) take a different approach to the same, measuring the competing risks 
of scheduled and unscheduled terminations.  Both approaches share the view that it is the unscheduled 
terminations that convey more information. 
36 Previous scholars typically use the effective number of parties in this context but, for reasons noted above, we 
feel the absolute number of parties, which has a direct and exponential effect on the number of possible 
coalitions, is a better measure of complexity.    
37 Finland, the country with mean durations closest to the overall mean, is the excluded category. 
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 Model 1 Model 2 
Model 3 
(country fixed 
effects) 
Number of parties 0.17** (0.06) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
-0.32* 
(0.16) 
CEU country 1.21** (0.29) 
0.93** 
(0.36) 
1.55* 
(0.76) 
Minimal winning coalition -0.44 (0.24) 
-0.40 
(0.24) 
-0.35 
(0.39) 
B*: System-dominant party  -1.32* (0.67) 
-4.03* 
(1.62) 
B: Strongly-dominant party  -1.33** (0.44) 
-3.57** 
(1.32) 
C: Top-three system  -2.03** (0.66) 
-4.71** 
(1.50) 
D: Top-two system  -0.82* (0.38) 
-3.08* 
(1.28) 
Log likelihood -213 -209 -173 
Observations 279 279 279 
Table 8. Cox proportional hazards models of post-electoral cabinet durations in European 
minority settings, 1945-2010. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Despite the vast number of theoretically possible seat distributions that could arise after any 
legislative election in a multiparty system, legislative party systems fall into a much smaller 
number of theoretically relevant equivalence classes. We exploit this to generate a mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive partition of the universe of possible seat distributions into five 
fundamental “types”  of  legislative  party  system (Figure 1). We show that these types differ 
from one another in theoretically significant ways. For example, in a Type B system with a 
dominant party, the largest party, and only the largest party, is a member of every two-party 
winning coalition. In a Type C system, no party outside the largest three is pivotal in any 
winning coalition. There is no two-party winning coalition in a Type E system, the only type 
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of party system not subject to the arithmetical constraints we identify, and which must 
comprise at least five parties. 
We classify postwar European party systems and show that regions of   the   “party  
system   space”   close   to   critical   boundary   conditions   between   types   are   densely   populated 
(Figure 2). Any legislative election is subject to stochastic processes, so that the result is in 
effect a random draw from a distribution of expected seat distributions. If this distribution 
straddles a key boundary condition, as Figure 2 implies it often does, different random draws 
from the same underlying distribution may well flip the resulting real party system from one 
state to another with theoretically critical effects. For example, as party systems flip 
stochastically into and out of Type C, a set of parties outside the top three flip into and out of 
a situation in which they are pivotal in winning coalitions, with substantial consequences for 
legislative bargaining. We also show that our exclusive and exhaustive partition of legislative 
party systems is of more than hypothetical interest. Differences between types of party 
system have substantial effects on: how long it takes to form a government (Tables 4 and 5); 
the type of government that eventually forms (Table 6); and the typical duration of the 
government that does form (Tables 7 and 8). 
Insights derived from our partitioning of legislative party systems are “model   free”,  
logical implications of the basic arithmetic of legislative voting. They do not depend on 
utility functions of key agents. They apply whether legislators are motivated by perks of 
office, by public policy preferences, by spite envy and greed, or by anything else – provided 
they seek to realize these objectives by forming winning coalitions in the legislature. They 
apply no matter what detailed institutional structures exist to circumscribe legislation or 
structure government formation. Such institutions may make a huge difference, but the basic 
legislative arithmetic imposes its own severe constraints on what can happen, regardless of 
whether the constitution allows the President to nominate the Prime Minister (as in France) 
or stipulates (as in Greece) that party leaders lead government formation negotiations in strict 
order of party size. Notwithstanding such important institutional factors, the basic legislative 
arithmetic still applies. Proposals must still win legislative votes, and the constraints imposed 
by our boundary conditions still bite. While particular well-specified models of legislative 
bargaining and/or government formation may well further constrain the set of outcomes 
implied by the basic legislative arithmetic we set out above, they cannot transcend this. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL 
 
FURTHER IMPLICATIONS OF INEQUALITIES DEFINING LEGISLATIVE TYPES 
 
Implication B4: The sizes of the three largest parties determine whether P1 is strongly dominant 
(the size of any other party has no bearing on this). If two smaller parties, Pi and Pj, render P1 
strongly dominant, then P2 and P3 also render P1 strongly dominant.38 The inequalities S1 + S3 ≥  W 
and S2 + S3 < W are necessary and sufficient conditions for P1 to be strongly dominant.  
Implication B5: If P1 is strongly dominant, then S3 < W/2.39  
Implication: C4: S2 ≥  W/2 is a necessary condition for a top-three legislative party system.40 This 
is the third result focusing our attention on W/2.  
Implication C5: If S1 + S3 ≥  W and S2 ≥  W/2, then S1 + S2 + S3 ≥  3W/2. The top three parties must 
between them control one and a half times the winning threshold in a top-three system, which can 
therefore never arise when the winning quota is greater than two-thirds of total seats. 
Implication D2: Since S1 + S3 < W, we know S3 < W/2 and since S1 + S2  ≥  W , we know S1 > W/241; 
indeed these are necessary conditions for a top-two party system. 
PARTY SYSTEMS AND POLICY DECISIONS 
Assume legislators vote on particular issues, and that possible positions on any given issue can be 
placed on a latent policy dimension. Assume that, for any issue under consideration, legislators have 
an ideal point on the latent dimension concerned, and a component of their utility function that 
declines monotonically as the policy agreed by the legislature moves further way from this. 
Differences between the types of party system set out above bear in striking ways upon policy 
outcomes that might emerge in such settings, because our boundary conditions impose different 
constraints on the identity of the party occupying the pivotal position on an arbitrary issue dimension 
– a dimension for which we are ignorant, a priori, of the ordering of party positions. First note that, if 
a party is pivotal to no legislative majority, it can never be in the pivotal position on any particular 
issue dimension.42 This is why our classification of legislative party systems bears directly on 
legislative voting on policy issues.  
In Type B* systems the system-dominant party, while not winning on its own, can form a 
winning coalition with any other party. It must therefore occupy the pivotal position on any issue 
dimension for which there is a party on either side of it. Logically, this implies: 
Implication B5*: A system-dominant party must be at the pivotal position on any issue 
dimension for which it is not at one of the most extreme party positions. If P** is at the 
extreme of some issue dimension, then the pivotal party must be adjacent to P**.43 The a 
                                                 
38 Since S2 ≥  S3 ≥  Si ≥  Sj, if the first two conditions strong dominance hold for Si and Sj, they hold a fortiori for 
S2 and S3. To see that the third condition also holds, note that if P1Pj is winning then its complement (P1Pj)’  is  
losing. For any j > 3, P2P3 is a subset of (P1Pj)’  and  thus  S2 + S3 < W. Thus, if the defining inequalities of 
strong dominance are fulfilled for any P1, Pi and Pj, they are fulfilled for P1, P2 and P3. 
39 If S2 + S3 < W and S2 ≥  S3, then S3 < W/2. 
40 S2 + S3 ≥  W, implies S2 ≥  W/2, since S2 ≥ S3.  
41 Since S1 ≥  S2 ≥  S3 
42 Note also that, taking at set of issue dimensions together and treating these as a multidimensional issue space, 
parties may occupy strategically important locations by virtue solely of their issue positions. However, leaving 
aside the possibility of log-rolling, when legislatures dispose of one issue at a time it remains true that a party 
pivotal to no legislative majority can never be pivotal on any issue dimension under consideration. 
43 Since P1** can form a winning coalition with any other party 
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priori probability that a system dominant party in an n-party system is pivotal on some 
arbitrary issue dimension under consideration by the legislature is therefore (n-2)/n.  
Even when there is an indefinite number of unknown issue dimensions that might form the 
basis of legislative decisions, therefore, the pivotal party on any issue is either the system-dominant 
party or the party adjacent to it, regardless of the positions of all other parties. A system dominant 
party therefore has substantial control over legislative policy outputs.  
In Type B systems a strongly-dominant party, P*, can form majority coalitions with both P2 
and P3, which implies: 
Implication B5: If P2 and P3 are on opposite sides of P* on some issue dimension, then 
P* is at the pivotal position, regardless of the positions of all other parties. 
This gives a P* a somewhat privileged position in affecting legislative policy outputs, though clearly 
less than that enjoyed by a P**. In Type C, top-three systems, no party outside the top three can be 
pivotal, so the pivotal party on any conceivable policy dimension must be to one of the three largest 
parties. Logically, this implies: 
Implication C5: The pivotal party on any issue dimension must be the most central of 
the top three, regardless of the issue positions of the smaller parties.44  
In  Type  D,  “top-two”,  party systems, it follows logically that: 
Implication D2: The pivotal party on any issue dimension must be located on the 
interval between P1 and P2, regardless of the positions of smaller parties.45  
This is much less a constraint on the location of the pivotal party on an arbitrary issue dimension than 
in the previous three settings. Indeed if P1 and P2 are at opposite ends of some issue dimension, it is 
no  constraint  at  all.  In  Type  E  “open”  systems, the defining inequality, S1 + S2 < W, implies that that 
all two-party coalitions are losing.  This imposes no constraint of substance on the location of the 
pivotal party on an arbitrary issue dimension. 
The results set out above highlight a stronger relationship than might hitherto have been 
suspected between constant sum bargaining over a fixed set of perquisites and variable sum 
bargaining over policy. The reason for this is that the identity of the pivotal party on an arbitrary 
policy dimension in a weighted voting game is determined as much if not more by party sizes as by 
party policy positions. One consequence of this is that the normalized Shapley value, typically seen as 
applying to constant sum bargaining over a fixed cake, has a precise interpretation in terms of 
variable sum legislative bargaining over policy. The normalized Shapley value of party P is the 
proportion of all orderings of coalition formation in which P is pivotal. This means that it is also the 
proportion of all orderings on an arbitrary policy dimension in which P is pivotal. The Shapley value 
of party P, therefore, is precisely the probability that P is pivotal on an arbitrary policy dimension. In 
this sense, the Shapley value has an intuitively meaningful interpretation in terms of legislative 
bargaining over public policy. 
SIMULATIONS OF SHOCKS TO SEAT DISTRIBUTIONS 
Here we provide additional detail about the simulation of seat allocations as realizations of a 
stochastic  process,  as  described  in  the  section  of  our  paper  “Fragility  of  Legislative  States.” We also 
provide supporting evidence for some of the assumptions behind our approach, epsecially the size of 
the unexplainable variance in seat allocations, in case the reader is not convinced that the actual 
variances would be as large as that specified by the multinomial distribution. 
                                                 
44 For any top-three party that is not the most central on some issue dimension, there must be a winning 
coalition of the two other top-three parties, either to the right or the left of it. Therefore the non-central top-three 
party cannot be pivotal on this dimension.  
45 Since P1P2 is a winning coalition, the pivotal party on any issue dimension cannot be either to the left or to 
the right of both P1 and P2. 
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Simulating outcomes according to the multinomial distribution assumes that the expected 
proportions of seat shares are fixed, but that each election represents a stochastic draw from this 
distribution. The fixed component can be thought of as a vector of seat proportions that is determined 
by a variety of political and contextual factors, some specific to parties, others to electoral system, 
political climate, and so on. Nonetheless, this set of fixed proportions foms only the expectation of a 
given seat allocation, from a stochastic (i.e. not deterministic) process. What are the sources of this 
variation? Random differences will come from a variety of factors that cannot be fully controlled, 
such as small variations in turnout, the unpredictable decisions of voters making up their minds at the 
last minute, or even votes cast by mistake. If a computer disaster were to strike following a day of 
voting, before any results were tabulated, and an embarrassed government were to ask the voters to 
turnout again the next day, we would not expect an identical outcome, although we would expect the 
party mean vote shares to be the same. The realization of these small differences in outcomes will be 
magnified by electoral systems that permit differences in votes to affect seat allocations in multiple 
contests. According to Borman and Golder (2013), of the 1173 electoral systems they surveyed from 
1946-2000, the median number of districts in an electoral system was 26, with over 22% also 
possessing upper tiers for more complex (mixed-level) allocations. Another 11% of these mixed 
majoritarian and proportional rules. The complexity of these systems means that small differences at a 
local level can produce shifts that when aggregated to national results, cause the shift of a few seats 
from one party to another. If an election were repeated under slightly different conditions, perhaps 
under different weather, or perhaps on the next day, we posit, the results would reflect these slight 
shifts, even though the systematic factors explaining most of the outcome would remain unchanged. 
The multinomial distribution as a model of seat outcomes 
Because legislative sizes are fixed, seats (and seat shares) are compositional data. Since our objective 
is to model the process according to a stochastic draw from vector of expected seat proportions, we 
employ the multinomial distribution, a distribution that produces expected integer counts given a set 
of proportions and a total number of  “trials”  (in  our  case,  seats  to  be  awarded).   
A feature of the multinomial distribution is that the variance of each outcome is linked to the 
proportion, through Var(si) = pi(1 - pi)n  where pi refers to the proportion of seats expected for party i, 
and n refers to the total number of seats in the legislature that will be allocated. This means that as a 
party’s   seat   shares   approach  0.5, variance is maximized, but also that the variance of the outcome 
increases as the size of the legislature increases. Both ideas are plausible: parties with greater 
numbers of expected seats will have higher possible numbers of seats reallocated randomly with each 
election, and a difference of five seats is much more plausible for a party expecting 100 seats than a 
party expecting 10. Similarly, the greater the total number of seats, the larger we would expect the 
effect of random shocks to have. A difference of 2 seats for a party can be treated as noise in the 650-
member British parliament, for instance, yet would precipitate a fundamental political crisis if it 
occurred in the seven-member Swiss federal council. 
Empirical calibration of simulation variances 
A valid question is whether the multinomial variance assumption is an accurate way of model the 
random, unexplained variance that can result in different seat allocations without the fundamental 
political circumstances being changed. We test the robustness of this assumption by looking at some 
empirical evidence on predicted seats shares in the post-war period. To test this we draw on seats and 
votes data from the Manifesto Project, supplemented with electoral system data from Bormann and 
Golder (2013). As a test of the relationship of the percentage of the vote to the size of the expected 
random component, we fit a model predicting seat shares as a function of the interaction of the 
percentage of the vote, the total seats in the legislature, and the log of average district magnitude, a 
model that predicts nearly 94% of the variance in absolute seat allocations. 
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Variable Estimate Std. Error 
Intercept 1.6600 1.33700 
% Vote **-0.1409 0.05352 
Total Seats in the Legislature **-0.02793 0.00415 
log(District Magnitude) -0.3988 0.48210 
% Votes x Total Seats **0.01252 0.00019 
% Votes x log(District Magn.) 0.0204 0.02278 
Total Seats x log(District Magn.) **0.006388 0.00172 
Tot. Seats x % Votes x log(District Magn.) **-0.0003747 0.00009 
R2 
 
0.9357 
sigma-hat 
 
13.14 
N   2674 
Table A1. Predictive Model of Seat Allocations given electoral size, total seats, and the log of 
average district magnitude. Data from Borman and Golder (2013) for electoral system data and the 
Manifesto Project (2012) for seats and votes data. 
 
Ideally, we would use the post-war   electoral   data   to   “calibrate”   a   model   of   unexplained  
variance for each election. This relies heavily on assumptions, however, since we never observe 
repetitions of an election under identical political conditions, but rather observe different election 
outcomes—usually separated by years—under different conditions. To justify our simulations using 
the multinomial variance, however, we need simply to provide evidence that the multinomial variance 
is conservative: that the real variances are likely to be larger. From Table A1, we computed a 
predictive confidence interval for SYRIZA, the second-largest party from the May 2012 Greek 
election, which from the data had 16.79% of the vote, had a log district magnitude of log(5.134), and 
a total size of 300 seats. Compared to actual seats won of 52 seats, our model predicted 53.96 seats—
very close—with a 95% confidence interval of 28.2 to 79.7. Compared to this predictive interval, the 
multinomial variance seems quite conservative. It is also easy to show that generally, the estimated V2 
of 13.142 = 172.66 is greater than the maximum multinomial variances of .5(1-.5)300 = 75. 
However, the linear model in Table A1 is only an approximation, and part of our argument 
for using the multinomial variance is that a greater range of deviations will occur when legislative 
sizes and party vote shares are larger. The relationship of the predicted vote to the residuals to the 
party’s  predicted  share  of  seats  is  plotted  in  Figure  A1.  Not  only  does  the  variance  in  the  prediction  of  
seats   expand   greatly   as   the   party’s   expected   share   of   seats   increases, but so does the size of the 
absolute residuals; differences of 10-20 seats are not at all uncommon, even for small seat shares. 
This suggests that even in a model which can predict 94% of the seat allocations in the post-war 
period given a fixed vector of expected seat shares and some basic variables on the size of the 
legislature and rules governing their allocation, there is an unexplained component that will cause 
results to vary even when these fundamental conditions are controlled for. 
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Figure A1. Residual v. Fitted Plot, in terms of expected versus actual seats from Table A1. 
 
Specific illustrations using recent elections 
To take the first of two concrete examples, consider the Greek elections of May 2012. These resulted 
in a Type D party system with 108, 52, 41, 33, 26, 21, and 19 seats held by seven parties. From our 
simulations given this distribution of legislative seat shares, this could have been realized as set of 
slightly different outcomes, resulting in different legislative types – for example, among many others: 
 
D 104 56 43 43 20 13 21 
B 112 52 51 29 29 13 14 
B 109 48 48 32 25 21 17 
B 113 50 39 33 37 16 12 
E 102 44 46 36 34 20 18 
The same election could plausibly have realized a Type D, B, or even a Type E party system – each 
with very different downstream political implications. In our simulations of the uncertainty around 
this particular observed outcome in Greece, a Type D party system was realized in only about 39% of 
simulated cases, with a Type B system being the most likely (52%) outcome. We estimated a very 
low probability that a Type B* or E system would have been realized. Our simulations of the 
“fragility”  of  the  May  2012  realized  outcome  in  Greece  outcome  are  consistent  with  the  argument  that  
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the June 2012 rerun of this election was in effect another random draw from the same stochastic 
process of seat distribution. 
In a second example, consider the Italian elections which took place in February 2013. 
Despite an electoral law designed to manufacture majorities by automatically awarding 55% of the 
seats to the largest party, this election failed to result in a majority party in the Senate, where this 
bonus mechanism operates only within each of 18 constituencies rather than on the national level. 
The two main coalitions—a centre-left coalition headed by Bersani and a centre-right coalition led by 
Berlusconi—polled 31.6 and 30.7 percent of the nationwide Senate vote respectively. The median 
difference in these  two  coalitions’ vote shares across the Senate constituencies was 0.5%, often just a 
few percentage points, or even fractions of a point, separating them. In the large constituency of 
Piedmont, with 22 seats to be allocated, the Bersani coalition took 13 seats because it polled first 
place in votes, although only by 0.5% of the vote ahead of its rival (which took only four seats). It 
would not be implausible to model the differences as normally distributed, even unconditionally, as 
shown in Figure A2.  
 
Figure A2. Density plot of vote share differences in vote shares of the two largest coalitions in 18 
multimember Senate constituencies from the Italian elections of February 2013. 
Even if we account for systematic factors, which we have not done here but would be entirely 
consistent with other election models that predict or forecast vote constituency-level shares (e.g. 
Linzer 2013), we would still expect a residual with a stochastic distribution with a non-zero variance. 
Examining   the   seat   allocation   at   the   national   level,   Italy’s   2013   election   to   the   Senate  
produced a Type C system46. Had an additional 13 seats (of 215) changed hands, however, Italy 
would have had a Type B system, possibly avoiding the political paralysis that resulted from its 
result, one that left Italy without a government for two months. While  the  Italy’s  electoral  rules  make  
the differences in small shocks exaggerated, Italy is hardly alone in having electoral systems where 
small, effectively random differences at the constituency level can be expected to shift a small yet 
highly consequential number of seats between parties in hypothetical repetitions of an election. 
 
                                                 
46 The exact seat totals were: Italy: Common Good (Bersani): 123; Centre-right (Berlusconi): 117; Five-Star 
Movement (Grillo): 54; With Monti for Italy (Monti): 19; and two seats held by regional parties. 
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